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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article VIE § 5 
of the Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(j) (1996); and Rules 3 and 
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
This appeal involves three (3) main issues. They are: 
Issue #1; 
Whether Plaintiff/Appellee Linda Brown's (hereinafter "Brown") claims against 
Defendant/Appellant Wardley Better Homes and Gardens (hereinafter "Wardley") 
(other than those for vicarious liability) should have been dismissed at the close of 
Plaintiffs case when Brown failed to produce any evidence that Wardley (other than 
through its agent Defendant Gerald Richards (hereinafter "Richards")) did anything 
wrong. 
Standard of Review: 
This Court's "standard of review of a directed verdict (or in this case the failure to direct 
a verdict) is the same as that imposed upon a trial court." Management Comm. of 
Gray stone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 
1982). A directed verdict should be granted only if, examining all evidence in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent evidence that would 
support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 
1383 (Utah 1995). A motion for directed verdict "can be granted only when the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 
Preservation of Appeal: 
Wardley moved the trial court for a directed verdict and the parties orally argued those 
motions at the close of Brown's case in chief, [pp. 145-60 of Transcript beginning at R. 
426 (hereinafter "426 Transcript")].1 At that time Brown agreed to dismiss all her 
While the Transcript of the testimony elicited at the trial of this matter is part of the record on appeal, 
the pages of the transcript of the trial testimony and arguments of counsel are not separately numbered. The 
testimony and arguments in question are comprised of three (3) volumes (VIDEOTAPED TRANSCRIPT, Trial 
Volume I starting at R. 424; VIDEO APPEAL TRANSCRIPT, Trial Volume II starting at R. 425; and 
TRANSCRIPT, Volume III starting at R. 426. Each will be referred to throughout this Brief by the word 
"Transcript" preceded by the initial page number given to each transcript volume by the trial court clerk. 
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claims against Defendant Steve Goff (hereinafter "GofP) as well as her claims for 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against both Richards and Wardley. [426 
Transcript, pp. 145-47]. The trial court then dismissed Brown's claims for negligent 
misrepresentation. [426 Transcript, pp. 156-60]. Only Brown's fraud claim against 
Wardley and Richards went to the jury. During argument on Wardleys Motion for a 
Directed Verdict, the parties stipulated that the fraud damages supported by the 
evidence were no more than $9,000. [426 Transcript, pp. 148-54 and 159-60]. 
Issue #2: 
Whether the trial court should have corrected the jury verdict of $9,000 compensatory 
damages against Wardley and $9,000 compensatory damages against Richards to 
accurately reflect the Parties' stipulation that $9,000 was the appropriate measure of 
compensatory damages awardable for Brown's fraud claim against Wardley and 
Richards. 
Standard of Review: 
A trial court may correct clerical mistakes in judgments at any time. Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(a). See also Bagnall v. Suburbia & Co., Utah, 579 P.2d 917 (1978). "[I]t matters 
little whether an error was made by the court clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or 
the judge himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that should be corrected in the 
interest of having judgment, order, or other part of the record reflect what was done or 
intended." Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). Such 
a mistake is one that is mechanical in nature and readily apparent on the record. Id. 
(Quoting In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967). 
Issue #3: 
Wether the trial court should have set aside the verdict and or should have refused to 
enter a separate judgment against Wardley (except vicariously for Gerald Richards1 
conduct) when there was no evidence whatsoever that Wardley (other than through its 
agent Richards) caused or contributed to Brown's damages. 
Standard of Review: 
In ruling on a motion to correct a verdict or for a j.n.o.v. the trial court has no latitude 
and must be correct. Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp, 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 
1996) (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). 
Nevertheless, a verdict should be corrected, or a j.n.o.v. granted, if "after looking at the 
evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the [nonmoving 
party], the trial court conclude[s] that there [is] no competent evidence to support a 
verdict in [the nonmoving party's] favor." Id. (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil 
Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). 
o 
Preservation of Appeal: 
Wardley filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for a 
New Trial with supporting memoranda following the trial and verdict in this matter. [R. 
266-287 and 374-382]. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 50, Utah R. Civ. P. governs motions for directed verdicts and judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict while Rule 60 governs the correction of errors in judgments or verdicts. 
The complete texts of Rule 50 and 60 are contained in Addendum A to this Brief. 
Utah Code Anno § 78-18-1 governs the award of punitive damages. Its relevant 
portions state: 
(l)(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions 
of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% 
of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after 
payment of attorneys1 fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for 
deposit into the General Fund. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE AND FACTS OF THE CASE 
Brown contracted to purchase a home with an enclosed swimming pool ("the Property") 
from Defendants Richard and Owna Miller ("the Millers"). During the negotiation process Wardley, 
by and through Richards, represented the Millers. [R. 15-17]. 
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Brown contracted to purchase the Property for $109,000.00, subject to the following 
contingencies: (1) her ability to sell her home; (2) her inspection of the Property; (3) her acceptance of 
the Millers' Sellers' Disclosures regarding the condition of the Property; (4) the Property appraising for 
at least $109,000; and (5) her ability to qualify for acceptable financing. [R. 15-17]. 
While the sale of the Property was pending, Brown spoke with Richards several times 
about the Property. They discussed the condition of the home, including the roof, the swimming pool 
enclosure, the electrical system and the plumbing. [424 Transcript (Volume I), pp. 14,17-18,23,44, 
62-64, 67-68 and 89-90; 425 Transcript (Volume II), pp. 24-25]. 
Brown and Richards also spoke about having the Property inspected by a local home 
inspection company. At trial Brown testified that she totally relied upon Richards to have the 
inspection done. [424 Transcript, pp. 40-43, 57,67-68 and 89-90]. Brown also testified that Richards 
misrepresented the extent and findings of the home inspection and caused her to believe a complete 
home inspection had been performed and that everything with the Property was all right. [424 
Transcript, pp. 62-64 and 89-90]. 
The Property was appraised by Brown's lender and she spoke with Richards about that 
appraisal. Brown received a copy of the appraisal from Richards prior to purchasing the Property and 
could have obtained a copy from her lender at anytime. In spite of having received the appraisal, 
Brown claimed that Richards mislead her about the appraisal by telling her the appraised value of the 
Property, $103,138.00, did not include the swimming pool and that he believed the swimming pool 
added an additional $15,000 in value to the home. [424 Transcript, pp. 93-95 and 98-100]. 
There is no evidence that Wardley knew or should have known that Richards made any 
misrepresentations to Brown regarding the inspection or the appraisal of the Property. In fact, Brown 
never spoke with anyone from Wardley (except Richards) until after she had already purchased and 
moved into the Property. [425 Transcript, pp. 42-43; and 426 Transcript, pp. 167-171]. 
The other contingencies in the contract to purchase the Property were fulfilled and 
Brown elected to proceed with the contract to purchase the Property for $109,000. 
After Brown moved into the home she claims to have discovered problems with water 
leaking into the swimming pool enclosure and with the electrical system. Brown also came to learn 
that the $103,138.00 appraisal actually included $3,138 for the swimming pool, making the appraised 
value of the home without the swimming pool $100,000. Brown then commenced an action in the 
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County against the Millers, Wardley and Richards. [R. 4-10]. 
The parties agreed that Wardley would be vicariously liable for the damages incurred by 
Brown which were caused by Richards1 breaches of his duties as a real estate agent. [426 Transcript, 
pp. 145 and 147]. 
The parties also stipulated that the appropriate measure of damages on Brown's fraud 
claims against Wardley and Richards would be $9,000 (the difference between the appraised value of 
the Property without the swimming pool ($100,000) and the price Brown paid ($109,000)). [426 
Transcript, pp. 148-54 and 159-60]. Brown's attorney acknowledged in open court that "ON THE 
FRAUD CLAIM, WE WOULD AGREE THAT THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO 
WARDLEY AND TO MR. RICHARDS IS $9,000 BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES 
THE VALUE OF THE HOME IS A HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS...SO WITH RESPECT TO 
WARDLEY AND TO MR. RICHARDS ON THAT ISSUE, YES, THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO $9,000." (Capital letters in the original) [426 Transcript, p. 151]. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Brown's Complaint asserted causes of action against all the Defendants for: (1) 
misrepresentation; (2) fraudulent concealment; and (3) negligence. Brown's Complaint also included a 
breach of contract claim against only the Millers and a claim against Wardley, Steve Goff (Richards1 
Branch Broker) and Richards for the alleged breach of their fiduciary duties. [R. 1-13]. 
The case was tried to a jury in February of 1998. At the close of Brown's case in chief, 
the parties stipulated to dismiss all the claims against Steve Goff as well as the negligence claims 
against all the Defendants and the breach of fiduciary duty claim against Richards and Wardley. [426 
Transcript, pp. 145-47]. Additionally, the trial court dismissed all Brown's claims for negligent 
misrepresentation. [426 Transcript, pp. 156-60]. Therefore, the only claims left for the jury to decide 
were the breach of contract and fraud claims against the Millers and the fraud claims against Richards 
and Wardley. Brown's claims against the Millers dealt with the condition of the Property while her 
claims against Wardley and Richards involved Richards' representations regarding the inspection and 
the appraisal. During oral argument on Wardleys Motion for a Directed Verdict, the Parties stipulated 
that the appropriate measure of damages on the fraud claims against Wardley and Richards would be 
$9,000 (the difference between the appraised value of the Property ($100,000) and the price Brown 
paid ($109,000)). [426 Transcript, pp. 148-54 and 159-60]. 
The jury returned verdicts against the Millers for $1.00; against Richards for $9,000 in 
compensatory damages and $7,000 in punitive damages; and against Wardley for $9,000 in 
compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. [R. 184-85]. Wardley objected to the verdict 
because it conflicted with the parties1 stipulations regarding Wardleys vicarious liability for Richards' 
conduct and the appropriate measure of damages, and because it did not comport with Utah law 
regarding respondeat superior liability or the award of punitive damages. [R. 266-287 and 374-382]. 
Wardleys Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial 
were both denied. [R. 369-72]. In anticipation of entry of a final judgment Wardley filed a notice of 
appeal. [R. 386-87] Nevertheless, a final judgment had not been submitted by Brown in time for that 
appeal to be heard and it was remanded. Finally, on February 29,2000, a Final Judgment on the Jury 
Verdict was signed and entered by the trial court. This Appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Wardleys liability in this case was secondary and derivative, arising from Richards1 
communications with Brown. Brown did not assert any claims, make any allegations or present any 
evidence at trial that Wardley independently did anything wrong. In spite of that fact, the trial court 
refused to direct a verdict in Wardleys favor for any independent liability and even allowed the jury to 
render separate verdicts against Richards and Wardley. The judgment rendered against Richards will 
constitute full compensation for Brown's damages and pursuant to well settled principles of law, the 
satisfaction of that judgment will relieve Wardley from any further liability and prevent Brown from 
recovering twice for the same measure of damages. 
Wardley also should not be vicariously liable for the punitive damage award issued 
against Richards. Wardley did not commit any wrongs independent of Richards, did not have any 
knowledge of Richards' allegedly wrongful conduct and did not ratify the misrepresentations upon 
which Brown's claims were based. 
Even though the parties stipulated and agreed and the trial court recognized that $9,000 
was the maximum amount Brown could recover on her fraud claim, the jury returned two separate 
verdicts for compensatory damages for $9,000 against both Wardley and Richards. The combined 
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judgment should have been $9,000. The trial court, however, refused to correct that clear mistake and 
alter the verdict and subsequent judgment to reflect the agreement of the parties and the applicable law. 
The complete lack of evidence regarding any separate wrongful conduct by Wardley 
required the trial court to set aside the verdict which the jury rendered against Wardley. The verdict 
could only stand upon separate allegations and evidence of wrongdoing by Wardley. No such 
allegations or evidence existed and, while Wardley is vicariously liable for damages caused by 
Richards1 wrongful conduct, a separate and distinct verdict against Wardley cannot be permitted to 
stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Wardlev's Vicarious Liability for the Damages Caused by Richards1 Breaches. Is 
Secondary And Derivative And Without Evidence Of A Breach (other than 
through Richards) By Wardley. Any Independent Claims Against Wardley Should 
Have Been Dismissed 
Joint liability of wrongdoers under common law arose where there was joint or 
contingent liability. An employer's vicarious liability pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
however, is secondary or derivative, and arises solely because of the employer's relationship to his 
employee and not due to any actual negligence by the employer. Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349, 
1351 (Utah 1986). Utah's tort reform act (Utah Code Anno. 78-27-37 through 43) instituted a 
comparative fault analysis where fault is apportioned among all those that are alleged to have caused or 
contributed to a plaintiffs damages. Utah's comparative fault statutes are intended to prevent any 
single defendant from having to pay for more than his or her own proportionate share of fault of a 
Plaintiffs damages. 
In this case Brown did not allege any independent cause of action against Wardley or 
claim that any of her damages were caused by Wardleys own negligence. Instead Brown alleged that 
Wardley was liable as a result of its relationship with Richards. If Brown had alleged that Wardley was 
liable because of its own conduct and produced evidence to support those allegations the jury would 
have been asked to apportion fault among Brown, the Millers, Wardley, Richards, the home inspection 
company and the appraiser and to determine whether Wardley should be held vicariously liable for 
Richards' actions. 
In order to simplify the issues and streamline the trial, however, Wardley agreed to be 
vicariously liable for the damages resulting from Richards' breaches of his duties as the Millers' agent. 
In spite of that concession and a record devoid of evidence , or even allegations, of actual negligence 
by Wardley (other than through its agent) the trial court failed to dismiss the claims against Wardley 
and allowed the jury to return a verdict against it. Any independent claims against Wardley should 
have been dismissed prior to any jury deliberations. 
A Single Judgment Against Richards1 For Which Wardley Is Vicariously Liable 
Will Fully Compensate Brown 
Pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers and employees may not be 
joint tort-feasors but they are, nonetheless, each obligated for the same thing-total reparation of the 
plaintiffs damages. Once a plaintiff has recovered all his damages, either from the employer or the 
employee, there is nothing else to collect. A plaintiff such as Brown "may not recover a windfall by 
receiving more than his actual damages." Nelson v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 935 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Utah 1997). Once the full amount of damages has 
been satisfied there is no cause of action against the master. M (Citing Knutson v. Morton Foods, 
Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex.1980). Allowing the jury to return separate verdicts against Wardley 
and Brown when Wardley should have only been vicariously liable to Brown for Richards1 wrongful 
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conduct, would permit Brown to recover twice for the same damage. The entry of a directed verdict on 
any independent claims against Wardley, on the other hand, would still give Brown her full recovery. 
The Punitive Damage Award Against Wardlev Is Impermissible Pursuant To Utah 
Law 
The trial court's failure to direct a verdict in favor of Wardley, except with respect to 
Wardleys vicarious liability, also allowed the jury to return verdicts for punitive damages against both 
Wardley and Richards for $20,000 and $7,000 respectively. The arguments set forth above regarding 
independent versus derivative liability for Brown's compensatory damages apply equally to the jury's 
award of punitive damages against Wardley. Without any wrongful conduct by Wardley (except 
through Richards) an award of punitive damages against Wardley cannot stand. 
Utah Code Anno § § 78-18-1 also precludes the award of punitive damages unless 
"compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others." In the instant case, Brown has not produced any evidence to support 
an award of compensatory or general damages due to Wardleys conduct (except through Richards) and 
a separate award of punitive damages against Wardley, therefore, is improper. 
Wardlev Should Not Be Held Vicariously Liable For The Punitive Damage Verdict 
Rendered Against Richards 
Wardley agreed to be vicariously liable for the damages incurred by Brown as a result of 
Richards' conduct. The punitive damage award, however, does not reflect damages incurred by Brown. 
It should be an amount intended to punish the wrongdoer, send a message and curtail future wrongful 
conduct. Since there is no evidence that Wardley independently did anything improper, it should not 
be responsible to satisfy any portion of the award for punitive damages awarded against Richards. 
An employer may be responsible for punitive damages resulting from an employee's 
conduct in any one of the following four circumstances: 
(a) if the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act; 
(b) if the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in 
employing or retaining him; 
(c) if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of 
employment; or 
(d) if the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act. 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 63 (Utah 1991); (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §217C (1958)). 
While documents regarding the Miller/Brown transaction were reviewed by Richard's 
Broker, Steve Goff, and appeared to be in order, there is no evidence that Wardley^ principal or a 
managerial agent authorized Brown to misrepresent the nature or results of the Property inspection or 
the content or meaning of the appraisal. Likewise there is no evidence (other than this single isolated 
incident) that Richards was unfit or that Wardley recklessly employed or retained him. To the contrary, 
Goff testified that he did not know of any complaints about Richards and wished that he had a 
"truckload of agents" like Richards. [426 Transcript, pp. 167-69]. It is also undisputed that Richards 
was a sales executive and not, therefore employed in any managerial capacity. Finally, there is no 
evidence that a principal or managerial agent of Wardley ever ratified or approved the 
misrepresentations complained of by Brown. Without clear and convincing evidence that Wardley 
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somehow participated in or ratified the wrongful conduct upon which the punitive damage award 
against Brown was based, Wardley should not be held vicariously liable for those damages. 
II. The Parties' Stipulation That $9,000 Was The Appropriate Measure Of Damages 
Awardable Against Richards And Wardley On Brown's Fraud Claim Obligated 
the Trial Court To Correct The Jury Verdict To Accurately Reflect The Stipulated 
Amount 
The parties agreed in open court that, based upon the evidence submitted, the maximum 
amount Brown could recover on her fraud claim against Wardley and Brown was $9,000. [426 
Transcript, pp. 148-54 and 159-60]. When the jury returned separate verdicts for compensatory 
damages against Wardley for $9,000 and against Richards for $9,000, the trial court should have 
altered the verdict to accurately reflect the parties' agreement. 
Pursuant to Rule 60(a) Utah R. Civ. P., the trial court can and should correct clerical 
mistakes in judgments at any time. Stanger v. Sentinal Security Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201,1206 
(Utah 1983) (citing Bagnall v. Suburbia & Co., Utah, 579 P.2d 917 (1978). The Stanger court went on 
to refer to the comment to Rule 60(a) Fed. R. Civ. P., which is identical to Utah's rule, which states "in 
this broad approach to correctability under Rule 60(a), it matters little whether an error was made by 
the court clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge himself, so long as it is clearly a formal 
error that should be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or other part of the record 
reflect what was done or intended." A correctable mistake will be one that is "mechanical in nature 
which is apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an 
attorney." Id (citing In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967). 
In the instant case it is clear from the record that the parties and the trial court all 
recognized that $9,000 was the maximum amount Brown could recover from Wardley and Richards on 
the fraud claim (the only claim that went to the jury). The parties and the trial court described the basis 
for that amount as the difference between the actual value of the home ($100,000) and the amount 
Brown Paid ($109,000). This is purely a mathematical calculation that should be corrected to 
accurately reflect the agreement of the parties and the order of the Court. There is no need for a legal 
decision or the judgment of an attorney or the court to correct this mistake. The trial court, therefore, 
should be instructed to reduce the amount of the compensatory damages awarded against Wardley and 
Brown to $9,000, consistent with the parties1 understanding and intention. 
III. Because Brown Did Not Assert Any Separate Claims Against Wardley Or Produce 
Any Evidence That Wardley (other than through Richards) Breached Any Duties 
It Owed To Brown, The Trial Court Should Have Set Aside The Verdict Which 
The Jury Rendered Against Wardley Or Granted A New Trial In Order To 
Clarify The Inconsistent Verdict 
A verdict must be preceded by allegations and supported by evidence. In the instant 
case Brown did not allege or present any evidence that, other than through Richards, Wardley did or 
did not do anything that caused her to be damaged. Brown's fraud claim arose from Richards1 alleged 
misrepresentations regarding the inspection of the Property and the appraisal. Brown's other claims 
against Richards and Wardley, however, were dismissed. Without allegations or evidence to support a 
claim that Wardley was somehow independently at fault, the separate verdict against Wardley should 
have been vacated by the trial court. 
Wardley^ liability in this case can only be based upon the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, whereby Wardley would be liable to Brown for damages inflicted by Richards in the course of 
his employment and within scope of his authority. As discussed above, however, that liability is 
derivative and secondary. Holmstead v. Abbott G. M Diesel Inc., 493 P.2d 625, 627 27 Utah 2d 109 
(1972); See also Nelson on Behalf of Hirschfeld v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter- Day Saints 935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1997). Without some separate and distinct 
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basis for liability of the master the resolution of claims against the servant will exonerate the master. 
Id, In this case the verdict against Richards together with Wardle/s admission of vicarious liability 
should have received Wardley from having to answer for any other claims, verdicts or judgments. 
The jury's verdict is, at best, confusing and contrary to the parties1 agreement and the 
evidence presented. Inconsistencies in verdicts should be reconciled with the facts, the jury 
instructions and the parties agreement. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 
1083 (Utah 1985). If the trial court could not reconcile the verdict with the parties' stipulation, the law 
and the evidence presented it should have granted a new trial. Instead of vacating the offending 
portions of the verdict, or granting a new trial, the court ignored the law regarding vicarious liability, 
ignored the lack of independent allegations against Wardley, ignored the lack of evidence regarding 
wrongful conduct by Wardley and let the verdict stand. This Court should correct that error and direct 
the trial court to set aside those portions of the verdict that relate directly to Wardley. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
For the reasons set forth above Wardley requests this Court to remand this case to the 
trial court with instructions that the verdict against Wardley be vacated, the claims against Wardley, 
except for those regarding its vicarious liability for the damages directly caused by Richard's wrongful 
conduct, be dismissed and that Wardley be held vicariously liable for only the verdict for compensatory 
damages rendered against Richards. 
1 A 
Appeal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29, Utah R. App. P. Wardley hereby requests oral argument on this 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ A day of August, 2000. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant/Wardley 
Steven B. Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the A/day of August, 2000, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was deposited in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
DANA T. FARMER, No. 8317 
DAVID L. KNOWLES, No. 5615 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blvd, Ste 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
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Cited in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 R2d 591 
(Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments to show that verdict in civil case was not 
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649. correctly reported, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial 1835 et Validity of verdict or verdicts by same jury in 
se(l- personal injury action awarding damages to 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 526 to 573. injured spouse but denying recovery to other 
A.L.R. — Submission of special interrogato- spouse seeking collateral damages, or vice 
ries in connection with general verdict under versa 66 A L R 3d 472 
Federal Rule 49(b), and state counterparts, 6 Products'liability: inconsistency of verdicts 
A.L.K.3d 438.
 o n s e p a r a t e theories of negligence, breach of 
Quotient verdicts, 8 ^ L R 3d 335. warranty, or strict liability, 41 A.L.R.4th 9. 
Competency of jurors statement or affidavit 
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves for a 
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. 
A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without 
any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for 
a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within 
ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance jvith his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may 
be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. 
If a verdict Was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may 
reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was 
returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for in 
Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion 
for -a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the 
judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for 
granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is 
thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the 
judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted 
and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the 
appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that 
denial; anjHf the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings 
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
| l 3 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 50 
fRule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding |the verdict. 
»* (d) Same: denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
iyerdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, 
lassert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court 
^concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment |notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
piothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
[entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether 
fa'new trial shall be granted. 
g& Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
t^o Rule 50, F.R.C.P. 
l Directed verdict. 
h£-In general. 
^Appeal. 
f——After failure to seek. 
f—Evidence. 
P-- Findings and conclusions not required. 
[+~ Instruction. 
—Jury trial. 
—Nunc pro tunc. 
Judgment notwithstanding verdict. 
—Appeal. 
-^Construction. 
—Evidence. 
U— Motion foreclosed, 
f—Ruling on reserved motion. 
—Splitting of negligence and damages issues. 
:
 Time of notice. 
Cited. 
Directed verdict. 
—In general. 
h In reality, ordering a directed verdict is an act 
of the court, the signing and entry thereof being 
formalities paying tribute to the history of the 
k
 practice. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204,240 
P.2d 491 (1952). 
y* A directed verdict is only appropriate when 
the court is able to conclude, as a matter of law, 
I that reasonable minds would not differ on the 
facts to be determined from the evidence pre-
sented. Management Comm. of Graystone Pine 
Homeowners Ass'n ex rel. Owners of Condo-
miniums v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1982). 
—Appeal. 
- Supreme Court's standard of review of a 
directed verdict is the same as that imposed 
upon the trial court; the evidence must be 
examined in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence and in the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom that would support a judg-
ment in favor of the losing party, the directed 
verdict cannot be- sustained. Management 
Comm. ofijffaystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n 
ex rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
i. The Supreme Court will sustain the granting 
of a motion for a directed verdict only if the 
evidence was such that reasonable men could 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
not arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. 
Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973). 
After failure to seek. 
Although party who does not move for di-
rected verdict generally has no standing to 
appeal on the basis that the evidence does not 
support the judgment, an exception exists 
where plain error appears in the record and 
would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975). 
—Evidence. 
In directing a verdict, the court must exam-
ine the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party against whom the verdict is intended; 
and it is not its province to weigh or determine 
the preponderance of the evidence. Finlayson v. 
Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). 
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, 
the court must consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion is directed and must resolve every 
controverted fact in his favor. Boskovich v. Utah 
Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953). 
A directed verdict pursuant* to Subdivision 
(a), upon the ground that the evidence fails to 
show that defendant is negligent, is tanta-
mount to granting a motion for a nonsuit, and 
on appeal must be reversed if the evidence is 
such that reasonable men could arrive at a 
different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 
Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
Mere fact defendant's horses escaped from 
inclosure was not sufficient, under § 41-6-38, to 
justify submitting defendant's negligence to 
jury in action by motorist whose vehicle struck 
a horse, and thus directed verdict for defendant 
was proper. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 
472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
In suit by wife for her personal injuries and 
husband's wrongful death in collision, wife's 
claim for injuries should have been submitted 
to jury since there was no evidence to establish 
any basis to impute alleged negligence />f hus-. 
band-driver to wife; wrongful death claim also 
presented question for jury since there were 
fact issues as to whether defendant's truck 
could be seen, whether husband was keeping a 
proper lookout and as to proximate cause. 
Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 
432 (1973). 
w& UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 
er-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ac-
^|in for wrongful discharge, 34 AX.R.5th 699. 
gllnattention of juror from sleepiness or other 
*cfcase as ground for reversal or new trial, 59 
&L.K5th 1. 
ggLExcessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
^damages for personal injury to or death of 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions 
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
USCS $§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. 
Fed. 189. 
Vik |pt(a). Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
[of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
[corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
[party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
a^n appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
[the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
f corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
|fc(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
\fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
* furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
•judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
'vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
JtAmended effective April 1, 1998.) 
;", Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
r amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
t^he following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
s^ummons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
, 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
; said action." This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-
flict with rules permitting service by means 
other than personal service. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above, and renum-
bered the grounds accordingly. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
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> *Any other reason justifying relief." 
\—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
'.—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
, —Refund of fine after dismissal. 
.Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
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COURT IS GOING TO EXCUSE THE JURY. I'LL ASK THE BAILIFF TO 
TAKE YOU BACK INTO THE JURY ROOM. WE HAVE A FEW MATTERS THAT 
WE'LL TAKE CARE OF. FOLLOWING THOSE, YOU'LL BE BROUGHT BACK 
IN. THANK YOU. 
(JURY WITHDRAWS.) 
THE COURT: MR. SABIN. 
MR. SABIN: YES. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAY IT 
PLEASE THE COURT, WE RESPECTFULLY MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL OF THIS 
ACTION ON THE BASIS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM UNDER ANY OF THE CLAIMS WHICH ARE ASSERTED 
HERE. NOW, I'LL -- MUCH OF THE STATEMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT, 
ALTHOUGH THERE'S SOME STIRRING UP OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION 
WHICH SEEM TO RELATE ONE TO ANOTHER, MAKE REFERENCE TO 
NEGLIGENCE. AND I UNDERSTAND MR. GRAHAM, HE ACQUIESCES IN THE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR NEGLIGENCE IN A 
MATTER -- IN A CASE OF THIS KIND BASED UPON THE MOCK CASE. 
AND SO THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE ARE OUT BECAUSE IT'S SOLELY A 
CLAIM FOR ECONOMIC DAMAGES. AND THE MOCK CASE IS VERY CLEAR 
ON HERE, AND I UNDERSTOOD MR. GRAHAM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WHEN 
YOU AND I AND HE WERE SITTING TOGETHER. 
SECONDLY, WE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WARDLEY BETTER HOMES 
AND GARDENS AS THE PRINCIPAL BROKER WOULD HAVE LIABILITY IF 
GERRY RICHARDS HAD LIABILITY. WE HAVE NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED WITH 
RESPECT TO MR. GOFF. THERE'S NOT A SHRED OF EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE COURT AS TO THE LIABILITY, IF ANY, OF A BRANCH BROKER IN 
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CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE. THERE'S NOT EVEN ANY CLAIM THAT 
MR. GOFF HAD ANY INDEPENDENT ACTIONS THAT HE HAD TAKEN. IT'S 
JUST SIMPLY A SECONDARY ACTION JUST BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION 
AS A BRANCH BROKER THAT HE IS SOMEHOW LIABLE. THERE'S NOTHING 
BEEN PRESENTED TO THIS COURT EITHER BY MEMO, BY EVIDENCE, BY 
WITNESS, AND SO THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH ANY 
LIABILITY TO STEVE GOFF, HE SHOULD BE DISMISSED. BECAUSE 
THERE'S BEEN NO EVEN -- NOT EVEN A STATEMENT ABOUT HIM OTHER 
THAN JUST SIMPLY HIS ROLE. 
NEXT, THE ALLEGATIONS OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST 
MR. RICHARDS. IT DOESN'T -- IT'S ABSOLUTELY FUNDAMENTAL THAT 
TO ESTABLISH A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE 
BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING WHAT THAT DUTY IS. AND THE WAY YOU 
ESTABLISH A DUTY, AND UNDER THE ISSUE OF A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY, JUST LIKE YOU WOULD ESTABLISH THE DUTY WHEN IT RELATES 
IT ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE, IS THERE MUST BE SOME EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH WHAT THAT DUTY IS. AND THE ONLY -- THE PERSON WHO 
CAN ESTABLISH THAT DUTY IS SOMEBODY WHO IS CAPABLE AND 
QUALIFIED TO BE ABLE TO TESTIFY AS TO WHAT THAT DUTY WAS --
MR. GRAHAM: YOUR HONOR, I CAN MAYBE SAVE SOME TIME 
FOR MR. SABIN. 
MR. SABIN: WELL, I'D JUST SOON NOT HAVE MY TIME 
SAVED. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: OH, GO AHEAD. 
MR. GRAHAM: IF IT'S GOING TO AFFECT THE RESULT OF 
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THIS, WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENCE, AS WE 
INDICATED WHEN WE STARTED, THAT'S FINE. WE STIPULATE WE HAVE 
THOSE DISMISSED --
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
MR. GRAHAM: -- BASED ON THE MOCK CASE AND THE 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES RULE. 
THE COURT: I THINK WE DISCUSSED THAT EARLIER. 
MR. GRAHAM: WE DISCUSSED THAT. THAT'S FINE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
MR. GRAHAM: WITH RESPECT TO MR. GOFF AS WELL, YOU 
KNOW, THIS WAS PRESENTED SIMPLY FOR THAT VERY REASON. WE 
DON'T BELIEVE THAT HE HAS ANY LIABILITY. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. GOFF IS DISMISSED. 
MR. GRAHAM: WITH RESPECT TO WARDLEY, OBVIOUSLY 
THERE'S A STIPULATION BASED ON MR. RICHARDS'S LIABILITY, THEN 
WARDLEY ALSO SHARES IN THAT LIABILITY. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AS WELL, WE'D 
STIPULATE THAT NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED AS TO 
ESTABLISHING A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. RICHARDS AND 
MISS BROWN. AND HAVEN'T ADMITTED ANY -- HAVEN'T CALLED FOR 
ANY EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE WRONG RELATIONSHIP OR ANY 
EVIDENCE TO ARGUE THAT HE HAD SUCH A COMPELLING FORCE ON HER 
AS TO CAUSE HER TO DO CERTAIN THINGS. SO WITH RESPECT TO THE 
CLAIM OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AS WELL (UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
THE COURT: THAT'S DISMISSED. 
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MR. SABIN: THANK YOU. I OWE YOU AN APOLOGY. I 
APOLOGIZE FOR -- FOR WHAT I NOW NEED TO SAY NICE THINGS ABOUT 
YOU, OKAY? TWO REMAINING ISSUES, YOUR HONOR --
MR. GRAHAM: I'LL PUT THAT IN MY POCKET. I MIGHT 
NEED IT. RIGHT NOW. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. SABIN: TWO REMAINING ISSUES. ONE HAS TO DO 
WITH THE REMAINING CLAIM OF FRAUD. AND THE OTHER HAS TO DO 
WITH THE FACT THAT WE DON'T HAVE THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES EVIDENCE. THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE AS TO 
ANYBODY WHO HAS TESTIFIED FROM SOME THIRD PARTY AS TO WHAT THE 
DAMAGES ARE, WAS THE ELECTRICIAN WHO JUST TESTIFIED, WHO JUST 
SIMPLY TESTIFIED AS TO WHAT EXPENSES WENT INTO WHAT THE 
ELECTRICAL COMPANY PUT INTO THE HOME. BUT EVEN THAT, 
THERE'S --OF COURSE IT'S MR. CAINE'S ARGUMENT --TO ARGUE AS 
TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY CAUSE OF ACTION THERE. BUT 
THE POINT IS, I -- ON A CONTRACT CASE, WE AREN'T EVEN ALLEGED 
TO BE A CONTRACT PARTY. BUT THE ONLY EVIDENCE -- AND I WOULD 
SUBMIT THAT EVEN THAT IS FAULTY -- IS THE EVIDENCE THAT CAME 
IN THROUGH THE ELECTRICIAN. 
FINALLY, YOU'VE GOT THE ISSUE OF FRAUD. AND WE WOULD 
SUBMIT THAT THERE'S NO -- THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PRIMA FACIE 
CASE ESTABLISHED ON FRAUD FOR A COUPLE OF THINGS. ONE, THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE THAT EITHER MR. RICHARDS, MR. MILLER, OR 
MRS. MILLER HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF ANYTHING WRONG AS IT RELATED 
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TO ANY LEAKS WITH THE ROOF OR THAT FIBERGLASS ROOF OR ANYTHING 
THAT RELATED TO THE ELECTRICAL OR INDEED ANYTHING ELSE WRONG 
WITH THAT HOME. THE ONLY EVIDENCE WHICH IS BEFORE THE COURT 
IS THE --IS THE IMPRESSION EVIDENCE THAT SAYS, WELL, IF YOU 
OCCUPIED THE HOME THAT LONG, YOU MUST HAVE KNOWN. BUT THE 
EVIDENCE IS BEFORE THIS COURT THAT CERTAINLY -- THAT CERTAINLY 
IS WITH RESPECT TO MR. RICHARDS, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE 
HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE AT ALL. SO CLEARLY AS IT RELATES TO ISSUES 
RELATING TO THE ROOF AND ISSUES AS IT RELATES TO THE --TO THE 
CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE 
WHICH IS REQUIRED, AND SO ACCORDINGLY, THERE'S NO EVIDENCE OF 
THE INTENTIONAL INTENT TO HAVE THEM --TO HAVE MISS BROWN RELY 
UPON THIS. 
THE ONLY REMAINING THING TO TALK ABOUT IS THE ISSUE OF 
MR. BROWN'S SUPPOSEDLY STATING --
MR. GRAHAM: MR. BROWN? 
MR. SABIN: I'M SORRY, MR. RICHARDS. OF MR. 
RICHARDS SUPPOSEDLY FRAUDULENTLY DEALING WITH MRS. BROWN WITH 
RESPECT TO THE INSPECTION AND THE APPRAISAL REPORT. I WOULD 
SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THE ISSUE AS TO WHAT HIS OBLIGATION 
WAS TO DELIVER AN INSPECTION AND TO DELIVER A APPRAISAL REPORT 
TIES IN WITH THE ISSUE OF HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY. AND IF INDEED 
HE HAS NO DUTY TO HER, THEN THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT-TAKE SOME 
ACTION TO DELIVER SOMETHING CANNOT BY ITS DEFINITION BE 
LABELED FRAUD. AND ON THAT BASIS, WE'D -- THERE'S -- AND 
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FINALLY, THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES THAT HAS BEEN PUT OUT 
HAS BEEN THE ALLEGATION THAT, LET'S SUPPOSE THAT THESE 
OTHER -- THAT ALL OF THESE CAUSES OF ACTION DID EXIST AND 
INDEED, THAT THERE WAS A DAMAGE TO MISS BROWN. WHAT'S HER 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES? HER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS TO SAY, YOU 
SOLD ME SOMETHING THAT WASN'T WORTH WHAT I PAID FOR IT, THEN 
HE OWE ME THE DIFFERENCE. 
NOW, I POINTEDLY ASKED THE APPRAISER IF HE HAS APPRAISED 
THE PROPERTY SINCE THE TIME SHE BOUGHT IT. HE DOESN'T --
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THIS COURT AS TO WHAT THE VALUE 
OF THAT PROPERTY WAS OTHER THAN THE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLAR 
APPRAISAL ON THAT AMOUNT. AND WHAT SHE'S ASKING IS TO TRY TO 
GET IN THE EVIDENCE THAT SOMEHOW SHE PAID $27,000 IN ORDER TO 
REPLACE THE ROOF. AND SO THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE ON 
WHAT SHE DID WAS SHE PAID $27,000 TO REPLACE THE ROOF AND SHE 
PAID THE ELECTRICAL SOMETHING. BUT THAT IS NOT THE MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES EVEN IF THERE WERE PROOF OF FRAUD IN THIS SORT OF A 
CASE. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT 
SHE PAID AND WHAT IT WAS WORTH AND SHE -- AND -- AND SO IF THE 
COURT WERE TO DETERMINE THAT THE APPRAISAL ITSELF MIGHT BE 
SUFFICIENT TO GET THAT --AT LEAST THAT ISSUE PASSED TO THE 
JURY, THERE SHOULD BE AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT THE 
MAXIMUM MEASURE OF DAMAGES HAS GOT TO BE THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN WHAT SHE PAID AND WHAT THE JURY DETERMINES THAT HOME 
WAS WORTH. AND WE WOULD SO SUBMIT. 
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THE COURT: LET'S SEE, MR. GRAHAM DO YOU TO GO 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) RESPOND. DO YOU WANNA GO, THEN YOU CAN GO? 
MR. GRAHAM: ANY WAY YOU WANT. 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD, MR. GRAHAM. 
MR. GRAHAM: OKAY. THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES AS IT 
APPLIES TO WARDLEY AND RICHARDS, ON THE FRAUD CLAIM, WE WOULD 
AGREE THAT THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT CHARGEABLE TO WARDLEY AND TO 
MR. RICHARDS IS $9,000 BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THE 
VALUE OF THE HOME IS A HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. I DON'T 
THINK THERE'S -- THAT AS OF THE DAY OF THE APPRAISAL, AS OF 
THE DAY OF CLOSING, IN FACT, IN THIS COURT, THERE ISN'T ANY 
OTHER EVIDENCE AS TO WHAT IT'S ACTUALLY WORTH, IF THAT IS THE 
EVIDENCE. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION ON THAT. 
THAT'S -- THAT WAS THE VALUE OF THE HOME. WHAT WAS PAID WAS 
$109,000. WHICH IS $9,000 IN EXCESS OF WHAT ITS VALUE WAS. 
SO WITH RESPECT TO WARDLEY AND TO MR. RICHARDS ON THAT ISSUE, 
YES, THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO $9,000. 
AND BELIEVE MR. SABIN CITES THE LAW CORRECTLY, THAT IN 
DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES IN A FRAUD CLAIM, IT IS THE 
AMOUNT -- THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AMOUNTS OF THE VALUE OF 
THE PROPERTY AND WHAT WAS ACTUALLY PAID FOR IT. AND THERE'S 
SOME LOGIC TO THAT MEASURE OF DAMAGES AND TO MAKE A PERSON 
WHOLE FOR THEIR FRAUD THAT WAS -- THAT WAS COMMITTED," THE 
AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT WAS OVERPAID. IT'S PAY THE PERSON THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THAT AMOUNT AND THE AMOUNT THAT THE REAL 
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VALUE WAS BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE EXPECTING. WE WOULD 
AGREE. 
NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE --MR. SABIN SAYS THERE'S ONE 
CLAIM LEFT OF FRAUD. THERE'S ALSO CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION IF YOU READ CAREFULLY THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
COMPLAINT. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS -- WELL, THERE'S 
A -- WE'VE GOT SOME NON STIPULATED JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT 
OUTLINE THE ELEMENTS TO THAT CLAIM. 
ALSO WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGES, IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS AS WELL, WE HAVE MEASURES 
FOR DAMAGES IN THAT INSTANCE AS WELL. 
NOW, THE -- THOSE CLAIMS RUN TO RICHARDS AND WARDLEY, 
BECAUSE AS THE EVIDENCE SHOW -- AND I -- WE'VE TRIED TO BE 
CONSISTENT, WHEN WE STARTED MONDAY MORNING, THE CASE THAT WE 
OUTLINED TO THE JURY WAS IN OPENING STATEMENTS, WAS THAT THERE 
WAS MISREPRESENTATION WHICH WAS INTENTIONAL OR NEGLIGENT IN 
THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MR. RICHARDS AND MISS BROWN ABOUT 
THE INSPECTION, DID IT ACTUALLY OCCUR, OF THE ROOF. AND ABOUT 
THE APPRAISAL. THE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE INSPECTION THE 
EVIDENCE IS, THAT WAS ADMITTED, THE EVIDENCE THAT CAME IN 
WAS -- FROM MISS BROWN WAS, HAD -- HAD SHE KNOWN THAT THE 
PROPERTY HAD NOT BEEN INSPECTED, THAT THE ROOF HAD NOT BEEN 
INSPECTED, SHE WOULDN'T HAVE CLOSED ON THE PROPERTY, -. 
THE EVIDENCE ALSO SHOWS -- THESE ARE FACTUAL QUESTIONS 
THAT OUGHT TO REACH THE JURY. THE EVIDENCE IS CONTRADICTORY 
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AND THAT DOESN'T SURPRISE US, WE'RE HERE, BUT THE EVIDENCE 
ALSO SHOWS THAT THERE WERE MISREPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE 
APPRAISAL, THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE HOME. 
NOW, WHAT -- WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THAT MAKE ON THE 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS? WELL --
THE COURT: YOU'RE CLAIMING THE MOCK CASE DOES NOT 
COVER NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
MR. GRAHAM: THAT'S CORRECT, IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THAT 
ISSUE. 
MR. SABIN: THE MOCK CASE DOES HAVE A CLAIM OF 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
MR. GRAHAM: WELL, THEN -- THEN LET'S TALK ABOUT THAT 
BECAUSE TO MY RECOLLECTION, IT DID NOT. BUT --
THE COURT: YOU'RE CLAIMING THAT IS SEPARATE AND 
APART FROM REGULAR NEGLIGENCE, THE NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION --
MR. GRAHAM: CORRECT, CORRECT. BECAUSE THE -- THE 
ELEMENTS TO SATISFY A NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM 
INCLUDE PECUNIARY INJURIES. AND THOSE ARE THE TYPES OF 
INJURIES WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE, SO -- BUT IN -- IN ALL 
HONESTY, I DON'T KNOW IF I CAN CREDIBLY ARGUE THAT WE OUGHT TO 
RECOVER TWICE, $9,000, FOR INSTANCE, ON A NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM AND $9,000 ON THE FRAUD CLAIM. I 
DON'T -- I DON'T FEEL THAT THAT'S -- I DON'T THINK THE LAW 
SUPPORTS THAT ARGUMENT. BECAUSE IN FACT, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
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ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION OF FRAUD, MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES IS THE SAME. IT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VALUE OF 
THE PROPERTY AND -- THE ACTUAL VALUE AND THE VALUE THAT WAS 
PAID, THAT WAS INDUCED BY EITHER THE NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION OR THE FRAUD. IN EITHER CASE, IN THIS CASE, 
IT'S $9,000. AND SO I WOULD SIMPLY ARGUE THAT ON EITHER 
CLAIM, THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IS $9,000. 
I DON'T THINK THERE'S A -- I DON'T THINK THERE IS A 
CREDIBLE ARGUMENT TO MAKE THAT, WELL, YOU CAN RECOVER $9,000 
TWICE. I DON'T THINK THAT'S WARRANTED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GRAHAM: ALSO, AS WE IDENTIFIED IN OUR OPENING 
STATEMENT, THE -- IN THE CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO WARDLEY HAD TO 
DO WITH THE APPRAISAL AND THE INSPECTION. THE DAMAGES OF THE 
FLOW FROM THOSE ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY AND THE AMOUNT THAT WAS PAID. THAT'S THAT WITH 
RESPECT TO WARDLEY AND MR. RICHARDS. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE MILLERS, OBVIOUSLY, OUR CLAIMS ARE 
BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT WHERE THE LANGUAGE IN THE REAL 
ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT IS CLEAR, ABOUT WHAT THE OBLIGATIONS 
WERE, THE EVIDENCE HAS COME INTO COURT AS --
THE COURT: THAT HASN'T BEEN RAISED AND I DON'T KNOW 
IF YOU'RE GONNA RAISE THAT. 
MR. GRAHAM: PERHAPS --
MR. CAINE: ABSOLUTELY. 
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THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GRAHAM: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: LET'S GET MR. CAINE TO RESPOND OR TO GO 
TO THAT ONE. WHY DON'T YOU FINISH AS IT RELATES TO -- AS IT 
RELATES TO RICHARDS AND WARDLEY. 
MR. GRAHAM: OKAY. I THINK, YOU KNOW, IT'S -- I WAS 
JUST GONNA SAY, I WANNA MAKE SURE I ADDRESS ALL THE ITEMS THAT 
MR. SABIN HAD RAISED. AND I'VE JUST RUN OUT OF INK. 
THE COURT: DO YOU NEED ANOTHER PEN? 
MR. GRAHAM: NO. WITH --
THE COURT: I'VE GOT A PEN IF YOU --
MR. GRAHAM: OH, THAT WOULD BE APPRECIATED. TRADE 
YOU. WITH RESPECT TO THE --MR. SABIN'S STATEMENTS THAT THERE 
ISN'T ENOUGH EVIDENCE FOR A PRIMA FACIE CASE, I UNDERSTAND HIM 
MAKING STATEMENT, BUT SURE THERE IS. SURE THERE IS. I MEAN, 
WE'RE NOT SURPRISED IN -- TO ANY DEGREE THAT THE EVIDENCE 
WHICH HAS COME IN BY MR. RICHARDS OR THE MILLERS IS AS IT IS. 
THAT WAS EXPECTED. BUT TO -- BUT TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT 
BECAUSE THE FACTS ARE IN DISPUTE, THAT THERE'S NO PRIMA FACIE 
CASE, THAT LOGIC DOESN'T FOLLOW. DOESN'T FOLLOW. EACH 
ELEMENT OF THE CLAIMS THAT WE HAVE AGAINST WARDLEY AND 
RICHARDS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE EVIDENCE. IF THERE'S NO 
COALESCING OF THE EVIDENCE BETWEEN THE OPPOSING PARTIES, THAT 
MEANS THE FACT FINDER HAS TO DETERMINE, HAS TO WEIGH THE 
EVIDENCE, HAS TO DETERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, 
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AND NEED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DECISION ABOUT WHETHER --
WELL, DIDN'T EXPECT, QUITE FRANKLY, THE MILLERS TO COME IN AND 
SAY, GEE, YOU KNOW, WE -- WE KNEW. THAT WASN'T ANTICIPATED. 
BUT THE EVIDENCE THAT'S BEEN SUBMITTED IN BOTH BY WAY OF MISS 
BROWN, BY THE --BY THE ITEMS, BY INDEPENDENT WITNESSES WHO 
HAVE NO INTEREST IN THE CASE, NO INTEREST WHATSOEVER, CLEARLY 
SHOW THAT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY HAD 
KNOWLEDGE OF IT. THE FACT THAT THEY SAY THEY DON'T, THAT'S 
THEIR TESTIMONY. BUT TO SAY THAT BECAUSE THEY SAY THAT THEY 
DIDN'T KNOW, THEREFORE, THERE IS NO CASE, IS I THINK NOT QUITE 
CREDIBLE. SO ON THAT ISSUE, I'D HAVE TO DISAGREE WITH 
MR. SABIN. THERE ARE FACTS IN DISPUTE. THE CASE NEEDS TO GO 
TO THE FACT FINDER. 
NOW, ON THE ISSUE OF -- WELL, I THINK (UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
THE COURT: YEAH, THANK YOU. LET'S --
MR. SABIN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) MR. CAINE'S, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: -- RESPOND. 
MR. SABIN: MAY I APPROACH? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. GRAHAM: HAVE YOU GOT A COPY FOR ME? 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. SABIN: WELL, I'M JUST STARTING. THE-MACK CASE 
IS VERY SIMILAR TO THIS CASE IN THE SENSE THAT THE BUYERS OF 
PROPERTY SUED THE SELLERS AND SUED THE SELLERS' AGENTS FOR A 
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WHOLE SERIES OF THINGS WHICH INCLUDED FRAUD, NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION, NEGLIGENCE, AND JUST THE USUAL SHOPPING 
LIST. AS YOU READ THE MOCK CASE, ONE THING OUGHTA BE 
PERFECTLY CLEAR IS THAT NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS 
NEGLIGENCE. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REGULAR 
NEGLIGENCE CASE AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS YOU HAVE TO 
STILL PROOF ESSENTIALLY THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD ONLY WITH A 
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD ON THERE. AS YOU LOOK AT THE MOCK CASE, 
THE COURT TOOK THINGS STEP AT A TIME AND STARTED TO THROW 'EM 
OUT. AND THE COURT THEN TOOK A LOOK BEFORE THEY EVER STARTED 
THE ECONOMIC DAMAGES ARGUMENT, THEY APPROACHED THE ISSUE OF 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. AND ON THAT CASE, THEY DIDN'T 
EVEN HAVE TO GET TO THE ISSUE OF THE DAMAGES BECAUSE THE COURT 
HELD ON THE NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CASE -- AND I'M 
REFERRING AT PAGE 577, THEY'RE SAYING THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
FAILED TO CONDUCT A REASONABLE INVESTIGATION OF THE MARKET 
VALUE PRIOR TO EXECUTING THE AGREEMENT. 
WELL, LET ME READ THE EXTRA WORDING. DEFENDANTS COULD 
HAVE ASCERTAINED WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE THE TRUTH OR 
FALSITY OF CAROL CLASS'S ALLEGED MISREPRESEN --
THE COURT: HELP ME OUT, WHERE YOU'RE AT. 
MR. SABIN: BOTTOM COLUMN OF 577, LEFT-HAND COLUMN. 
IT'S THE ITALICIZED INFORMATION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. GO AHEAD, I'M WITH YOU. 
MR. SABIN: AND THEY'RE QUOTING THE CLASS CASE. AND 
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THEY'RE SAYING THE DEFENDANTS COULD HAVE ASCERTAINED WITH 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF CAROL CLASS'S 
ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATIONS BY REQUESTING COPIES OF THE 
APPRAISALS OR DEMANDING TO KNOW THE BASIS FOR HER INFORMATION 
OR BY OBTAINING AND INDEPENDENT APPRAISAL OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY. SAYS, SINCE THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE WERE AVAILABLE 
TO DEFENDANT, AND SINCE THEY FAILED TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF 
THESE MEANS, THEY CANNOT CLAIM -- THEY CANNOT NOW CLAIM TO 
HAVE BEEN DECEIVED BY THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE VENDOR. NOW, 
IN THIS CASE, WE HAD MANY OF THE SAME SORT OF CLAIMS. I 
RELIED UPON YOU BECAUSE YOU TOLD ME CERTAIN THINGS. AND THEY 
WENT ON AHEAD TO SAY THAT -- I'M READING NOTE NUMBER 3, 
ALTHOUGH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS NOT INCLUDED DUE DILIGENCE 
AS AN ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, IT HAS REQUIRED 
A SOMEWHAT ANALOGOUS ELEMENT OF REASONABLE RELIANCE. 
AND THEN THEY WENT AHEAD AND IN THE REST OF FOOTNOTE 3, 
FOOTNOTE 4, THEY FIND THAT THERE WAS -- THAT THERE WAS NO 
BASIS FOR --OR THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE RELIANCE ON THE 
BASIS OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE, AND SO THEY THREW IT OUT 
ON ITS OWN MERITS. THEN THEY GET FURTHER IN AFTER THEY TALK 
ABOUT FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT, AND THEN THEY TALK ABOUT 
FRAUDULENT DISCLOSURE, AND THEN THEY GET CLEAR OVER ON 579 AND 
THEY START TALKING ABOUT THE ECONOMIC LOSS OF NEGLIGENCE. 
NOW, IF THERE'S A BASIS FOR A DISPUTE OF FACTS FOR THE 
JURY, TO GO TO THE JURY ON ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD, THEN SO BE 
159 
IT. BUT IF THE ALLEGATION IS NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, 
THAT'S PRECISELY WHAT I'M SAYING. THE COURT HAS SAID IN THE 
MOCK CASE THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE A CLAIM UNDER NEGLIGENCE FOR 
PURELY ECONOMIC DAMAGES. AND IF THERE'S A CONTRACT, IF 
THERE'S A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY CLAIM, IF THERE'S A FRAUD CLAIM, 
THEN THOSE -- THEN THOSE ARE OTHER ELEMENTS AND WAYS IN WHICH 
PEOPLE CAN REACH IT. BUT NEGLIGENCE IS NEGLIGENT, AND WHETHER 
YOU CALL IT NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION OR JUST NEGLIGENCE, 
IT'S NEGLIGENCE. AND SO WHAT I'M SAYING IS THE MOCK CASE 
THREW THAT OUT. AND IT THROUGH IT OUT FOR TWO REASONS. ONE, 
IT THREW IT OUT ON ITS OWN MERITS BECAUSE THEY FOUND AT MOCKS 
HADN'T UNDERTAKEN REASONABLE EFFORTS, AND THEY THREW IT OUT ON 
THE ECONOMIC BASIS. 
AND SO IT SEEMS TO ME, THE ONLY REAL ISSUE FOR THIS COURT 
TO CONSIDER IS WHETHER OR NOT YOU FEEL THAT THERE'S BEEN A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST GERRY RICHARDS AND WARDLEY THAT 
RELATES TO THIS ISSUE OF THE INSPECTION AND THE APPRAISAL. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. SABIN. THE COURT FINDS 
THAT THERE IS -- I'M GOING TO LET IT GO TO THE JURY AS IT 
RELATES TO THE ISSUE OF FRAUD. NOT THAT THERE WAS SOME ACTION 
TAKEN, BUT THAT MAYBE THERE'S SOME FACTS THAT CAN GO TO THE 
JURY. BUT NOT AS TO NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION IS NEGLIGENCE, AND THAT'S OUT. 
ALSO, THERE IS A STIPULATION AS TO THE MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES. WE WON'T NEED GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT, AND THAT 
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NEEDS TO BE HANDLED IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. AND I SUSPECT 
THAT YOU CAN WORK THOSE OUT. MR. CAINE. 
MR. CAINE: WELL, AGAIN, WITH THAT RULING, BECAUSE 
OF THE NATURE OF SOME OF THOSE ARGUMENTS, I WAS GONNA MAKE THE 
SAME ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE BREACH OF CONTRACT. I'M 
ASSUMING THAT NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS OUT AGAINST ONE, 
IT'S OUT AGAINST ALL. 
THE COURT: CERTAINLY. 
MR. CAINE: AND SO I CAN GET UP AND TALK TO YOU FOR 
A HALF AN HOUR ABOUT WHAT I THINK ABOUT THE BREACH CONTRACT 
CLAIM (UNINTELLIGIBLE) --
THE COURT: AND I'LL DENY IT. 
MR. CAINE: OKAY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. LET'S BRING THE JURY 
IN. 
MR. CAINE: WELL, I AM GONNA ARGUE THAT TO THE JURY. 
THE COURT: WELL, CERTAINLY. I WOULD EXPECT THAT 
YOU MAY SAY SOMETHING TO THE JURY ABOUT THAT. 
MR. CAINE: ALL RIGHT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S JUST LOGISTICALLY, HOW ARE 
WE GONNA HANDLE THIS? WHO'S GONNA GO FIRST? 
MR. SABIN: I'LL GO FIRST. 
THE COURT: OKAY. SHALL WE --
MR. SABIN: YEAH, WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO. MAY WE HAVE 
JUST A MOMENT? 
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This case comes before the court on Defendants', Richards and Wardley, Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or For a New Trial. This case was tried to a jury for several days and 
concluded with a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Compensatory damages of one dollar ($1.00) were 
awarded against the Millers, the sellers, and compensatory damages of nine thousand dollars ($9,000) 
against Richards, the real estate agent with punitive damages of seven thousand dollars ($7,000) against 
Richards. Compensatory damages of nine thousand dollars ($9,000) from Wardley, the real estate 
broker and punitive damages against the broker of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, the defendants did not make a Motion for Directed 
Verdict. Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure, plaintiff argues that failure to raise 
such a motion generally precludes a Motion of Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict. Despite the 
language of Rule 50 and some strong language in cases cited, there is an exception for the filing of a 
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Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in cases where there is the existence of plain error 
that would result in the miscarriage of justice. 
The standard this court must use is whether there is no substantial evidence to justify the verdict 
rendered by the jury. In meeting the standard, the court is required to accept as true all the testimony 
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which tend to prove plaintiffs case and disregard all 
conflicts in the evidence which tend to disprove. There was evidence presented by the plaintiff, as a 
witness, by Joseph Anderson and other witnesses where the jury could draw by reasonable inference that 
Richards committed fraud. Recognizing that much of the testimony given by the witnesses for the 
defense, contradicted that of the plaintiff, the standard set forth above precludes the court from granting 
the motion regarding Richards. Because of the evidence presented that Richards' actions were 
fraudulent, and that he was acting as Wardley's agent at the time and acting to further Wardley's 
interests, Wardley is vicariously liable. Nelson v. Corporation of the President 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 
1997). 
Defendant's motion, pursuant to Rule 50, is denied. 
Next, the court reviews Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The standard for the court in determining whether a new trial may be granted on all 
or part of the issues, and for all or part of the parties, is whether the jury's award indicates that the jury 
disregarded competent evidence, or that the award is so excessive that is beyond rational justification as 
to indicate the effect of improper factors in the determination, or that it clearly appears that the award 
was rendered under a misunderstanding. 
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The jury awarded an amount of nine thousand dollars ($9,000) as compensatory damages 
against each of the defendants, Richards and Wardley. Plaintiff presented evidence and argued that 
the measure of damages should be the difference between the actual value of the property of one 
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) and the amount of one hundred eighteen thousand dollars 
($118,000) because of questions related to the value of the pool. It appears that the jury accepted 
the position of the plaintiff and allocated specific awards to both Richards and Wardley totaling 
eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000). 
Punitive damages are allowed only where it is established by clear and convincing evidence that 
the acts or omissions of the defendants are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of the 
rights of others. Richards mental state may be imputed to Wardley to support a punitive award against 
Wardley if there was evidence Wardley ratified or approved the act. The evidence at the time of trial, 
including that of Steve Goff, was sufficient for the jury to find approval or ratification by Wardley. 
The standard this court must reach is not whether it agrees with the verdict rendered by the jury, 
but whether the evidence at trial was so completely lacking and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust. The punitive damages given by the jury fall within the ratio of three (3) 
to one (1) given by the appellate courts to assist in determining the appropriateness of the amount of 
punitive damages when comparing the compensatory damages. 
The attorneys for all the parties were extremely well prepared. They presented their case 
throughly and very professionally. The members of the jury were chosen by the parties from a pool of 
members of the community. The jury listened intently to the evidence as it was presented. All eight 
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members of the jury agreed with the verdict they rendered. There is no evidence of the jury being under 
the influence of passion or prejudice in awarding the damages. 
Rule 59 requires that this court find grounds in order to grant a new trial or reduce the award. 
After participating with the jury in this multiple day trial, this court can not find that the compensatory 
or punitive damages were a result of passion or prejudice or that the jury could not support there verdict 
based on the testimony of the witnesses, other evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom. 
Defendant's Motion For a New Trial is denied. 
DATED this Jj*_ day of July, 1998. 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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